THE VENONA INTERCEPTS
Washington, D.C. (1946-1980)
Events: Postscript -- The
Nuclear Age, 1945-present
Soviet intelligence officers in the United States regularly communicated with
their superiors in Moscow via telegraphic cables. These messages were
encrypted of course, but in 1946 the United States, with the assistance of Great
Britain, began to decrypt a good number of these messages. This program
led to the eventual capture of several Soviet
spies within the Manhattan Project. The VENONA intercepts, as they were codenamed, remained a
closely-guarded secret, known only to a handful of government officials, until
the program was declassified in 1995.
The cables should have been impossible to decrypt. Collecting them was
easy. The United States government simply acquired copies of all cables
openly sent to and from various Soviet embassies and consulates.
These messages were encrypted by a means known as a "one-time pad."
This meant that, at least in theory, decrypting them should have been
impossible. The Army's Signal Intelligence Service began working on the
problem in 1943, and they gradually discovered a Soviet procedural error
that
allowed many of the messages to be painstakingly decrypted. Portions of
messages began to become clear in 1946, and by 1948 numerous messages were being
recovered by the team led by Meredith Gardner (above). In 1948, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was also brought
into the investigation, its efforts led by Robert Lamphere (right).
Although only
messages up to 1945 were vulnerable to decryption, and these messages were several years old by that point, they still contained references to spies
who had never been detected, including many who presumably continued to work
for Soviet intelligence. From 1948 to 1951, numerous Soviet spies were
uncovered and prosecuted this way, including the atomic spies Klaus
Fuchs (below), David Greenglass,
Greenglass's handler Julius Rosenberg, and Rosenberg's wife Ethel.
Other
sources, such as Theodore Hall, were detected, but
without sufficient corroborating evidence other than VENONA, the government was
unable to prosecute them. (The VENONA secret was considered too valuable to
reveal as evidence in an open court proceeding.)
Once messages were decrypted and translated into English, however, the
identity of the individuals mentioned in them was still often not
apparent. Soviet intelligence assigned every person a unique codename and
sometimes changed it. (For example, Julius
Rosenberg was ANTENNA, later
changed to LIBERAL, and Theodore Hall was MLAD.) Nonetheless, it was often
possible to determine who each codename referred to based on clues within the
messages. Sometimes the message where the individual is first given a
codename happens to be one of those decrypted, in which case the
individual's identity is known with certainty. In other cases, rather
obvious clues make identification simple, such as when the name of ANTENNA's
wife was openly given as "Ethel." Most people were identified
through follow-up investigation by the FBI based on the descriptions of their
work, their lives, their appearance, and even their codename itself. (MLAD
means "youngster" in Russian; Hall was only 19 when he began his work
as a spy.) In some cases, especially when dealing with sources
who were only mentioned in a handful of decrypted messages, a Soviet
spy's identity remains unknown to this day.
Additional wartime messages continued to be decrypted during the 1950s and
beyond, but the "value added" of these decryptions gradually lessened
over time. Soviet intelligence learned of the VENONA program in 1949
through its highly-placed British agent, Kim Philby, but there was nothing they
could do to stop it. The program was finally formally terminated on
October 1, 1980.
Rumors of an important codebreaking effort circulated among journalists and
historians throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, but there was no formal
confirmation of the existence of VENONA until it was declassified in 1995.
Today anyone who is interested can view images of the actual decrypted cables on
the National Security Agency's web page at http://www.nsa.gov/venona/index.cfm.
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